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OPINION OF THE COURT 





NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Melvin P. Deutsch appeals from an order that dismissed 
his in forma pauperis complaint as "frivolous or malicious" 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988); the district 
court determined that the relief Deutsch sought was a "trifle" 
and thus not worthy of adjudication.  We will affirm, but for 
reasons other than those offered by the district court.  We hold 
that a court may dismiss an in forma pauperis claim as frivolous 
if, after considering the contending equities, the court 
determines that the claim is: (1) of little or no weight, value, 
or importance; (2) not worthy of serious attention; or (3) 
trivial. 
I. 
 Deutsch filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and 
a complaint, alleging that prison guards took his writing pens 
and never returned them.  Deutsch also alleged that he had filed 
a tort claim with the federal government in September 1994, but 
that the government declined to offer a settlement because it 
found no evidence that his pens had been taken.  Deutsch then 
filed this action, which the district court properly construed as 
a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 
2671-2680 (1988).  Deutsch requested $4.20 for his pens, plus 
litigation costs, attorney's fees, and interest. 
 The district court granted Deutsch leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis but dismissed the complaint under § 1915(d).  The 
district court determined that the $120 filing fee paid by every 
non-indigent plaintiff has the practical effect of precluding 
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insubstantial claims seeking solely monetary damages.  It 
concluded that the in forma pauperis legislation was not intended 
to encourage indigent plaintiffs to assert claims that a non-
indigent plaintiff would not.  The district court was unable to 
conclude that the case was legally or factually frivolous, or 
that it was brought for a malicious purpose, but instead 
determined that under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex,0 
plaintiff's claim, which is limited solely to monetary damages in 
the amount of $4.20, was encompassed by the phrase `frivolous or 
malicious' as used in § 1915(d).  Accordingly, it dismissed the 
complaint. 
 Deutsch filed a notice of appeal and a motion for leave 
to appeal in forma pauperis.  We notified the parties that we 
would consider summary action pursuant to Internal Operating 
Procedure 10.6.  Deutsch did file a summary action response.  We 
will consider this appeal on the district court record and the 
United States Attorney's response.0 
                     
0
 "The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or 
trifling matters.  The law does not concern itself about 
trifles."  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990). 
0
 The U.S. Attorney's Office responded to our notification that 
we would take summary action on this appeal by directing our 
attention to United States v. Bradley, 892 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 909, 110 S. Ct. 1935, 109 L.Ed.2d 298 
(1990).  We will take notice of the Bradley opinion because, in 
that case, Deutsch lied to a district court, claiming that he was 
an attorney and that he should be permitted to enter an 
appearance as trial counsel for a criminal defendant.  Deutsch is 
not, and never has been, an attorney.  After considering the 
situation, the court of appeals felt compelled to issue a 
warning:  "Deutsch is a con man, a fraud, a phony, a humbug, a 
mountebank--in short, an impostor. . . .  Judges should be on the 
lookout for Mr. Deutsch, whose persistence suggests that he may 
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II. 
 (a) Jurisdiction 
 We have held that an order dismissing a complaint 
without prejudice is not final under § 1291, and thus not 
appealable.  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  In Borelli, we recognized that an 
exception to this jurisdictional rule exists if the plaintiff 
either cannot cure the defect that led to dismissal or elects to 
stand on the dismissed complaint.  Id. at 951-52.   
 Here, the district court failed to specify whether the 
§ 1915(d) dismissal was with or without prejudice, and there is 
no indication in the opinion accompanying the dismissal order 
that the court expected Deutsch to file a curative complaint. 
Although the filing of a paid complaint has not been prejudiced, 
we will review the order appealed pursuant to § 1291.  The 
district court's order is in essence final, because an in forma 
pauperis plaintiff must be afforded appellate review of a 
determination that he is required to pay all or a portion of the 
court costs and filing fees to file a claim, either because he 
does not qualify for in forma pauperis status or because his 
complaint is frivolous.  See Roberts v. United States Dist. 
Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845, 90 S. Ct. 954, 94 L.Ed.2d 1326 (1950) 
(per curiam) (order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis is 
final, collateral order that is appealable under § 1291); see 
also Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir. 1976).   
                                                                  
have other marks in sight."  Id. at 634-35; see also United 
States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 939 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989).   
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 Alternatively, if the plaintiff has expressed an intent 
to stand on the dismissed complaint, or if it appears that the 
plaintiff could do nothing to cure the complaint's defects, then 
the order is likewise appealable under § 1291.  Riley v. Simmons, 
45 F.3d 764, 770 (3d Cir. 1995); Presbytery of N.J. Orthodox 
Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1461-62 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Here, it appears that Deutsch could not cure the defect 
that led to dismissal because the relief he sought was determined 
to be too small an amount to survive § 1915(d) scrutiny. 
Accordingly, we conclude the order is appealable under § 1291. 
 (b) Standard of Review 
 We apply a deferential abuse of discretion standard 
when reviewing a district court's decision to dismiss an in forma 
pauperis complaint under § 1915(d).  Denton v. Hernandez, 504 
U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992).  However, 
even within this narrow scope of review, to the extent that the 
district court, in the course of its frivolousness determination, 
engaged in the choice, application, and interpretation of legal 
precepts, our review is plenary.  See Louis W. Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citing Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 
98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
III. 
 The district court relied on the maxim de minimis non 
curat lex and concluded that Deutsch's complaint was "frivolous 
or malicious" within the meaning of § 1915(d).  The Supreme Court 
has recognized that "the venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex 
7 
. . . is part of the established background of legal principles 
against which all enactments are adopted, and which all 
enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept." 
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Wrigley, 505 U.S. 214, 231, 112 S. 
Ct. 2447, 120 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992).  Given the importance of the 
maxim de minimis non curat lex in American jurisprudence, it is 
clear that the district court's reliance on that maxim was well-
intended.  We conclude, nonetheless, that the plain meaning of 
the term "frivolous" authorizes the dismissal of in forma 
pauperis claims that, like Deutsch's, are of little or no weight, 
value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or 
trivial.  A dismissal based upon the maxim de minimis non curat 
lex would encompass claims beyond the parameters of § 1915(d), 
and is unnecessary to the determination that Deutsch's complaint 
should be dismissed.  We will affirm on the narrower ground that 
the complaint was frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d).0 
 The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, "is 
designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access 
to the federal courts."  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 
109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing 
Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342-43, 69 
S. Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43 (1948)).  Specifically, Congress enacted 
the in forma pauperis statute to ensure that administrative court 
costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone 
                     
0
 Because our discussion is confined to the "frivolous" standard, 
we need not decide whether Deutsch's complaint was also 
"malicious" within the meaning of § 1915(d). 
8 
else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from 
pursuing meaningful litigation.  Denton, 504 U.S. at 31; Jones v. 
Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1985).  To that end, 
§1915(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
Any court of the United States may authorize the 
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, 
action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal 
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or 
security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that 
he is unable to pay such costs or give security 
therefor. 
 
See also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441, 82 S. Ct. 
917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962).   
 Congress was also concerned, however, that indigent 
persons could abuse this cost-free access to the federal courts. 
Denton, 504 U.S. at 31; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324.  ("When 
Congress opened the door to in forma pauperis petitions, it was 
concerned that the removal of the cost barrier might result in a 
tidalwave [sic] of frivolous or malicious motions filed by 
persons who gave no pause before crossing the threshold of the 
courthouse door.").  McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617 F.2d 1016, 1019 
(3d Cir. 1980).  Thus, Congress sought to empower the courts to 
dismiss the abusive filings0 that could result from the absence 
of a cost barrier by including § 1915(d), which authorizes a 
court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint "if satisfied 
                     
0
 We note parenthetically that Melvin Deutsch has filed 20 civil 
actions since 1992.  Nevertheless, given the basis on which we 
are affirming the district court's order, we need not decide 
whether he has abused his right of access to the courts by 
repeated, frivolous filings.  
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that the action is frivolous or malicious."  See Denton, 504 U.S. 
at 31. 
 As the in forma pauperis legislation, which was first 
enacted in 1892, begins its second century, it is clear that 
Congress' use of the term "frivolous" in § 1915(d) has left the 
federal courts with an imprecise standard for determining whether 
an in forma pauperis complaint abuses the federal legal system. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that 
the brevity of § 1915(d) and the generality of its 
terms have left the judiciary with the not 
inconsiderable task of fashioning the procedures by 
which the statute operates and of giving content to 
§1915(d)'s indefinite adjectives.  Articulating the 
proper contours of the § 1915(d) term `frivolous,' 
which neither the statute nor the accompanying 
congressional report defines, presents one such task. 
   
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-35 (footnote omitted).  Like the other 
courts of appeals, we have established procedures by which § 1915 
is to operate.0  Here, we must consider the contours of 
                     
0
 In this Circuit, leave to proceed in forma pauperis is based on 
a showing of indigence.  Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 
(3d Cir. 1990).  We review the affiant's financial statement, 
and, if convinced that he or she is unable to pay the court costs 
and filing fees, the court will grant leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis.  Id.  Thereafter, the court considers whether the 
complaint is "frivolous or malicious" within the meaning of § 
1915(d).  Id.  We also recognize that "extreme circumstances" 
might justify denying an otherwise qualified affiant leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis.  Lockhart v. D'Urso, 408 F.2d 354, 355 
(3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam).  Although we have not delineated the 
circumstances that might be sufficiently "extreme" to justify 
denial, we remain open to the possibility that an affiant may 
someday warrant invocation of this exception to the usual 
procedure.  Cf. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180, 111 S. Ct. 596, 
112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991) (per curiam) (barring abusive petitioner 
from in forma pauperis status when seeking extraordinary writs 
and stating that "the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis 
status to those individuals who have abused the system."). 
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§1915(d)'s frivolous standard to address whether the court is 
authorized to dismiss an in forma pauperis claim if it determines 
that the controversy under the claim is trifling. 
  Preliminarily, we note that the Supreme Court has 
already defined some contours for the frivolous standard.  For 
example, a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory 
may be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(d).  Neitzke, 490 U.S. 
at 327; Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Accordingly, we held in Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 334-
35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 806, 111 S. Ct. 237, 112 
L.Ed.2d 196 (1990), that a prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint 
alleging that prison officials had violated his right of access 
to the courts was not legally frivolous because the district 
court could not conclude that the allegations turned on an 
indisputably meritless legal theory.  Section 1915(d) also 
authorizes the dismissal of a complaint as factually frivolous if 
a court determines that the contentions are clearly baseless. 
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328.  In Denton, the Supreme Court held 
that "a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the 
facts alleged rise to the level of the wholly irrational or the 
wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable 
facts available to contradict them."  504 U.S. at 33. 
 The Supreme Court has only begun, with Neitzke and 
Denton, to define § 1915(d)'s frivolous standard.  See Adams v. 
Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he term `frivolous' [] 
connotes discretion because, as a practical matter, it is simply 
not susceptible to categorical definition.  Although the Supreme 
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Court has loosely defined frivolous claims, . . . it has declined 
to fashion too precise a rule."); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 
724 (4th Cir. 1989).  More specifically, Neitzke and Denton do 
not preempt us from considering whether § 1915(d)'s use of the 
term "frivolous" includes trivial claims, because neither opinion 
places the contours of the frivolous standard beyond the purview 
of further judicial inquiry. 
 "Where, as here, the resolution of a question of 
federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we 
look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative 
history if the statutory language is unclear."  See Toibb v. 
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2199, 115 L.Ed.2d 
145 (1991).  Accordingly, we turn to the issue on appeal, which 
requires that we look to both the language of § 1915(d) and the 
congressional intent underlying its enactment.   Blum v. Stenson, 
465 U.S. 886, 896, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1548, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). 
We recognize that, as an interpreting court, we must begin with 
the "assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose."  FMC Corp. v. 
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 
(1990) (quoting Park `N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 
U.S. 189, 194, 105 S. Ct. 658, 661, 83 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985)). 
 The Supreme Court has determined that the meaning of 
"frivolous" in § 1915(d) is "indefinite."  Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 
325 ("neither the statute nor the accompanying congressional 
reports [define frivolous]"); see H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1892); see also Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 
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490 U.S. 296, 302, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) 
(referring to the Report of the House Judiciary Committee as 
generally "unilluminating").  When a term is defined neither by 
the statutory text nor its legislative history, we must construe 
it in accordance with its ordinary and natural, or plain, 
meaning.  See Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't 
of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, ___ U.S. ____, 114 S. Ct. 2251, 
2255, 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994) (citing Smith v. United States, 508 
U.S. ____, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2055, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993).  Thus, 
in determining whether the Congress used "frivolous" to authorize 
the dismissal of trifling or trivial claims, we must look to the 
plain meaning of "frivolous," consonant, of course, with the 
general legislative purposes served by the in forma pauperis 
statute.  See Mallard, 490 U.S. at 300-02. 
 "Frivolous" means "of little or no weight, value, or 
importance; paltry; trumpery; not worthy of serious attention; 
having no reasonable ground or purpose."  The meaning of 
"frivolous" was the same in the 1890s, when the in forma pauperis 
statute was first enacted, as it is today.  THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 556 (1987); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 535 (2d 
ed. 1982) ("(1) unworthy of serious attention; trivial; (2) 
inappropriately silly"); THE NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY 618 (D. Appleton-
Century Co. 1927) ("of little or no weight, worth, or importance; 
paltry or trivial; not worthy of serious notice; characterized by 
lack of seriousness or sense; given to trifling or levity.").  
Commonly used synonyms for frivolous include "impractical," 
"insignificant," "minor," and "trivial."  The plain meaning of 
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"frivolous" indicates that Congress intended §1915(d) to 
authorize a court to dismiss a complaint when it determines that 
the action is, inter alia, "of little or no weight, value, or 
importance," "not worthy of serious attention," or "trivial."   
 In Neitzke, the Supreme Court began the task of 
defining the frivolous standard by looking to its definition of a 
legally frivolous appeal set forth in cases not dealing with 
applications of § 1915(d).0  In Denton, the Supreme Court again 
looked to the legal sense of "frivolous" when it refined the 
standard that governs the dismissal of factually frivolous 
claims.  See 504 U.S. at 32-33.  Significantly, because there is 
no indication in the statute or the legislative history that 
"frivolous" was used in § 1915(d) in a legal sense only--thus 
excluding from consideration the term's other meanings in common 
usage--we must presume that Congress did not intend to define 
                     
0
 The Court stated in Neitzke that 
 
[t]he Courts of Appeals have, quite correctly in our 
view, generally adopted as formulae for evaluating 
frivolousness under § 1915(d) close variants of the 
definition of legal frivolousness which we articulated 
in the Sixth Amendment case of Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738[, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] (1967). 
There, we stated that an appeal on a matter of law is 
frivolous where `[none] of the legal points [are] 
arguable on their merits.' 
 
490 U.S. at 325.  We think it would be unwise to construe this 
ambiguous statement, albeit one proffered by the Supreme Court, 
as indicative of an intent to limit the Courts of Appeals to 
these variants of the Neitzke question: i.e., "whether a 
complaint that fails to state a claim under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 
12(b)(6) is necessarily frivolous within the meaning of 
§1915(d)."  490 U.S. at 324.  We do not infer that the Court 
would deem unacceptable those formulae developed for evaluating 
frivolousness in other contexts. 
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"frivolous" in a manner that would immure the concept it defines 
from the remainder of the it's plain meaning.  See Connecticut 
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 117 
L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("[C]ourts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says there."); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises Inc., 489 
U.S. 235, 241-42, 109 S. Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989).  
 Looking to the context in which "frivolous" is used in 
§ 1915(d), we find further support for viewing the term with a 
broad sense of its plain meaning.  See Reno v. Koray, ___ U.S. 
____, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2025, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (drawing 
meaning of a word from the context in which it is used.); 
Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 
135, 112 S. Ct. 515, 519, 116 L.Ed.2d 496 (1991); Hudson United 
Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 43 F.3d 843, 848 n.11 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Section 1915(d) is phrased so that a finding that an 
action is frivolous is conjoined as an alternative to a finding 
that an action is malicious.  A court that considers whether an 
action is malicious  must, in accordance with the definition of 
the term "malicious," engage in a subjective inquiry into the 
litigant's motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit 
to determine whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or 
harass the defendants.   
 The frivolous standard, by contrast, as the Supreme 
Court impliedly recognized in Neitzke and Denton, requires that a 
court also assess an in forma pauperis complaint from an 
objective standpoint in order to determine whether the claim is 
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based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly 
baseless factual contention.  See Denton, 504 U.S. at 34; 
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.  We presume that, in accordance with 
Congress's intent to empower the courts with broad discretion to 
dismiss the abusive filings that would result from the absence of 
a cost barrier (see Denton, 504 U.S. at 33), the conjunction of 
the objective "frivolous" standard as an alternative to the 
subjective "malicious" standard indicates Congress's desire to 
grant the judiciary a sufficient scope of power to maintain 
meaningful control over the filing of in forma pauperis 
complaints.   
 In accordance with this broad grant of authority, 
Congress presumably intended the courts to consider the plain 
meaning of "frivolous" when analyzing a claim, because a crabbed 
or contrived interpretation would not serve a court when it 
evaluates whether an in forma pauperis complaint abuses the legal 
system.  Indeed, by way of negative inference, we know that 
Congress did not express concern that one could abuse the legal 
system only by filing legally frivolous claims; rather, Congress 
was concerned that there would be many varieties of abuse 
resulting from the absence of a cost barrier.  Thus, we conclude 
that under § 1915(d), a court may also properly focus on whether 
the action is frivolous in the sense that it is: (1) of little or 
no weight, value, or importance; (2) not worthy of serious 
consideration; or (3) trivial. 
 This interpretation of § 1915(d)'s frivolous standard 
is consistent with the goals of the in forma pauperis 
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legislation, and we are confident that giving effect to the 
entire plain meaning of "frivolous" will not produce "a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters." Griffin 
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S. Ct. 3245, 
3230, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982).  Indeed, in our view it would be 
anomalous to conclude that the in forma pauperis legislation, 
while seeking to "assure equality of consideration for all 
litigants[,]" Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. at 447, would 
also seek to encourage an indigent litigant such as appellant to 
pursue suit upon a trivial claim that a paying litigant would not 
file, because common sense and the practical effect of having to 
pay $120 in filing fees to recover $4.20 would in effect preclude 
the suit.  Thus, a plain-meaning interpretation of "frivolous" 
serves the drafters' intentions quite well:  § 1915(d) authorizes 
a district court to dismiss trivial claims brought to the courts 
simply because, upon the grant of in forma pauperis status, there 
is no longer the ordinary economic disincentive to doing so.  See 
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. 
 At the time § 1915 was enacted, Congress recognized 
that "a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by 
the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive 
to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive 
lawsuits."  Denton, 504 U.S. at 31 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324).  In recent years, 
however, it has become clear that the absence of a cost barrier 
is, as Congress feared it would be, the primary reason indigent 
litigants do not refrain from filing frivolous lawsuits.  See, 
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e.g., Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 16-17, 112 S. Ct. 355, 
116 L.Ed.2d 293 (1991) (per curiam) ("[I]n forma pauperis 
petitioners lack the financial disincentives--filing fees and 
attorney's fees--that help to deter other litigants from filing 
frivolous petitions[.]"); In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 
13, 14, 111 S. Ct. 1572, 114 L.Ed.2d 15 (1991) (per curiam) 
(noting lack of economic disincentives and amending Supreme Court 
Rule 39 so that the Court can deny in forma pauperis status to 
those who submit "frivolous or malicious" filings); Lumbert v. 
Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 827 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 784-85 (11th Cir. 1984); 
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984); Anderson 
v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1983).  Although § 1915 
was enacted to remove the cost barrier that kept indigent persons 
from the federal courts, Congress did not intend that the courts 
ignore, particularly when applying § 1915(d), Congress' concern 
that absence of an economic disincentive could lead to litigation 
that abuses the system. 
 The Supreme Court has determined that § 1915(d) "is 
designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of 
judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that 
paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs 
of bringing suit[.]"  Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see Roman v. 
Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 195 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Adams v. Rice, 40 
F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Congress enacted § 1915(d) in order 
to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none 
of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless 
18 
claims."); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 1989) 
("[Section] 1915(d) seeks to forestall frivolous pro se lawsuits 
that would not be brought by paying litigants.").  In essence, 
§1915(d) represents Congress's attempt to codify its awareness 
that paying litigants, unlike indigent litigants, consider the 
economic feasibilities of suing before filing a lawsuit.  When 
one must pay the expenses of pursuing litigation, one will first 
consider whether the costs of suing will be greater than the 
benefits to be gained.  See Lumbert, 827 F.2d at 259; Evans v. 
Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1153, 102 S. Ct. 1023, 71 L.Ed.2d 309 (1982).  If it seems that 
the cost/recovery differential will be too great, the reasonable 
paying litigant will be dissuaded from filing.  Neitzke, 490 U.S. 
at 328.0 
 The absence of an economic disincentive has developed 
into a major concern for the federal courts since the explosion 
of in forma pauperis prisoner litigation began almost thirty 
years ago.  We have been, and remain, cognizant that "the cost in 
                     
0
 In Neitzke, the Supreme Court distinguished § 1915(d)'s 
standard for dismissal from that of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 
finding that 
 
[t]his conclusion follows naturally from § 1915(d)'s 
role of replicating the function of screening out 
inarguable claims which is played in the realm of paid 
cases by financial considerations.  The cost of 
bringing suit and the fear of financial sanctions 
doubtlessly deter most inarguable paid claims, but such 
deterrence presumably screens out far less frequently 
those arguably meritorious legal theories whose 
ultimate failure is not quite apparent at the outset. 
 
490 U.S. at 328. 
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time and personnel to process pro se and in forma pauperis 
pleadings requires some portion of the court's limited resources 
and ties up these limited resources to the detriment of other 
litigants."  Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d at 332; see also In 
re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 S. Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 
(1989) (per curiam) ("Every paper filed with the Clerk of this 
Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some 
portion of the institution's limited resources.").0  Of course, 
both paying litigants and in forma pauperis litigants with 
meaningful claims continue to suffer from the drain on human and 
economic resources that results from meritless suits.  ("[There 
are] problems in judicial administration caused by the surfeit of 
meritless in forma pauperis complaints in the federal courts, not 
the least of which is the possibility that meritorious complaints 
will receive inadequate attention or be difficult to identify 
                     
0
 The Supreme Court has begun to bar abusive petitioners from 
receiving in forma pauperis status.  See, e.g., In re Whitaker, 
___ U.S. ____, 115 S. Ct. 2, 130 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (per curiam) 
(barring abusive petitioner from proceeding in forma pauperis 
when seeking extraordinary relief); In re Anderson, 511 U.S. 
____, 114 S. Ct. 1606, 128 L.Ed.2d 332 (1994) (per curiam) 
(same); In re Sassower, ___ U.S. ____, 114 S. Ct. 2, 126 L.Ed.2d 
6 (1993) (per curiam) (barring abusive petitioner from proceeding 
in forma pauperis in non-criminal matters when seeking 
extraordinary relief and certiorari review); Martin v. District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals, ___ U.S. ____, 113 S. Ct. 397, 397, 
121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (per curiam) (barring abusive petitioner 
from receiving in forma pauperis status to file petitions for 
writs of certiorari); Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. at 18 
(denying in forma pauperis status to two abusive petitioners); In 
re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 111 S. Ct. 1569, 114 L.Ed.2d 20 (1991) 
(per curiam) (barring abusive petitioner from proceeding in forma 
pauperis when seeking extraordinary relief); In re Sindram, 498 
U.S. 177, 179-80, 111 S. Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991) (per 
curiam) (same). 
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amidst the overwhelming number of meritless complaints."). 
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326.  Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 
1536 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Litigation in federal court is not a free 
good, and litigation by prisoners places heavy burdens not only 
on the courts themselves but on other litigants, whose cases are 
shoved further back in the queue."); Savage v. Central 
Intelligence Agency, 826 F.2d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Not even 
the cause of prisoners' rights is helped by the flood of trivial 
suits that distracts judicial attention from the occasional 
meritorious one."); Raymon v. Alvord Indep. School Dist., 639 
F.2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) ("Each litigant who 
improperly seeks federal judicial relief for a petty claim forces 
other litigants with more serious claims to await a day in 
court.").  The legislation does contemplate providing access to 
indigent persons, but "cost-free" is a misnomer, because the 
taxpayers must pay to support the system, both with money and in 
the sense that they receive diminished services from the courts. 
See Free, 879 F.2d at 1539 (Coffey, J., concurring). 
 In Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 
331, 69 S. Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43 (1948), the Supreme Court 
interpreted several provisions of the in forma pauperis statute. 
In the Court's unanimous opinion, the most important 
consideration for the Court in analyzing § 1915 was the financial 
impact that those seeking the benefits of the in forma pauperis 
statute would have on the financial interests of the taxpaying 
public.  For example, in the context of an indigent appellant's 
request to have superfluous matters printed for inclusion in the 
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record on appeal, the Court stated that "[w]e do not think that 
the court was without power to protect the public from having to 
pay heavy costs incident to the inclusion of `wholly unnecessary' 
matters in an in forma pauperis appeal."  Id. at 337. 
Furthermore, the Court added: 
We know of few more appropriate occasions for use of a 
court's discretion than one in which a litigant, asking 
that the public pay costs of his litigation, either 
carelessly or willfully and stubbornly endeavors to 
saddle the public with wholly uncalled-for expense. 
 
Id.  The lesson to be drawn from Adkins is that the courts must 
not forget that the public has a legitimate financial interest at 
stake under the in forma pauperis statute, and that the 
judiciary's role is not only to consider, but to protect, the 
public's interest in assuring that the in forma pauperis 
legislation does not serve wasteful ends. 
 In addition to authorizing a court to dismiss abusive 
claims when those claims are appropriately classified as 
"frivolous or malicious," § 1915(d) also serves the frequently 
overlooked purpose of providing the courts with a vehicle for 
conserving scarce judicial resources and assuring that resources 
are used in the most just manner possible.  See Adams, 40 F.3d at 
74 ("[Section 1915(d) is] a statutory provision whose purpose is 
to conserve judicial resources[.]"); see also Green v. McKaskle, 
788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Section 1915 provides free 
access to the courts.  Care must be taken to ensure that such 
access is not abused."); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d at 43, 
(Section 1915 "demands that attention be paid to the conservation 
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of scarce judicial resources.").  It is our view that § 1915(d) 
was not intended to allow indigent persons cost-free access to 
the federal courts such that the courts' resources could be 
depleted by complaints that paying litigants would not file.0 The 
important goal of assuring equality of consideration for all 
litigants is not furthered when the courts allow such trivial 
claims to drain their limited resources. 
 In sum, we conclude that Congress intended the court to 
look to the plain meaning of "frivolous" in § 1915(d).  We hold 
that § 1915(d) authorizes a court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 
claim if it determines that the claim is of little or no weight, 
value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or 
trivial. 
IV. 
 To find that an in forma pauperis litigant's claim is 
trivial, a court must be satisfied that the record supports a 
finding that a reasonable paying litigant would not have filed 
the same claim after considering the costs of suit.  Accordingly, 
the court must first find the actual amount in controversy under 
the claim presented0 and determine whether the amount in 
                     
0
 Courts sometimes require in forma pauperis plaintiffs to pay a 
portion of court costs and filing fees.  Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 
F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985); see Walker v. People Express 
Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 832, 111 S. Ct. 97, 112 L.Ed.2d 68 (1990).  We commend 
such procedures.  Although we believe that requiring partial 
payment remains a sound solution, it is not necessary that 
district courts rely exclusively on partial payment, particularly 
when § 1915(d) authorizes the dismissal of claims that are filed 
because there is no economic disincentive. 
0
  We are mindful that some litigants request large sums for a 
monetary remedy.  That a complaint requests a large sum in 
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controversy is less than the expense of the court costs and 
filing fees.  If the court so determines, then the claim is a 
candidate for dismissal as frivolous under § 1915(d).0   
 The court must next determine whether the litigant has 
a meaningful nonmonetary interest at stake under the claim, such 
that service of the complaint and an allocation of the court's 
resources for its adjudication is warranted, despite the fact 
that the claim is economically trivial.  If, in addition to 
finding that the amount of damages in controversy is less than 
the court costs and filing fees, the court is satisfied that 
there is no other meaningful interest at stake, then the suit is 
frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d).   
 The relevant guidepost for a district court is whether 
a reasonable paying litigant would have paid the court costs and 
filing fees to bring the same claim.  We do not, however, confine 
the courts to rigid formulae when determining whether a claim is 
sufficiently "meaningful" to survive dismissal as frivolous.  Cf. 
                                                                  
damages should be of no moment when a district court inquires as 
to whether a claim is economically trivial.  See Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 
(1978) ("Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by 
federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.") 
0
 Related litigation expenses (e.g., attorney's fees, the threat 
of sanctions), which along with court costs and filing fees 
enhance the economic disincentive for the paying litigant, must 
not be considered in determining whether the amount in 
controversy under the claim is economically trivial.  The in 
forma pauperis statute is concerned only with clearing the hurdle 
created by court costs and filing fees.  Denton, 504 U.S. at 27 
(Section 1915 "allows an indigent litigant to commence a civil or 
criminal action in federal court without paying the 
administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit."); Neitzke, 
490 U.S. at 324.  Accordingly, a court must not factor in other 
litigation expenses when making this initial determination. 
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Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Section 
1915(d) gives district courts broad discretion to determine 
whether appointment of counsel is warranted, and the 
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis."), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ____, 114 S. Ct. 1306, 127 L.Ed.2d 657 (1994). 
Nevertheless, the courts should be cognizant of several 
considerations. 
 We recognize emotions are intensified in the insular 
life of a correctional facility and that prisoners often must 
rely on the courts as the only available forum to redress their 
grievances, even when those grievances seem insignificant to one 
who is not so confined.  A court must therefore take into account 
the unique nature of each claim presented and the extent to which 
the claim is "meaningful" to one in the litigant's situation. 
Hence, in determining whether a claim is meaningful, a court must 
protect the right of indigent persons to have access to the 
courts.  See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982).   
 A court must also consider whether the litigant is 
filing the litigation to pursue a non-meaningful activity, such 
as harassment or entertainment, or merely to hone litigation 
skills.  See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326-327, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 
1084, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting)  ("[Inmates are] in a different litigating posture 
than persons who are unconfined.  The inmate stands to gain 
something and lose nothing from a complaint stating facts that he 
is ultimately unable to prove.  Though he may be denied legal 
relief, he will nonetheless have obtained a short sabbatical in 
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the nearest federal courthouse.") (footnotes omitted); Lumbert v. 
Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 827 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1987) 
("the problem of [frivolous litigation] is even more acute when 
the indigent plaintiff is a prison inmate, because the costs of a 
prisoner's time are very low."); Savage v. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 826 F.2d 561, 563-64 (7th Cir. 1987) ("No rational system 
of government burdens its highest courts with a class of 
litigation dominated by petty cases typically brought for their 
nuisance value by persons on whose hands time hangs heavy."). 
 In sum, a court must balance the equities and dismiss 
the claim only if it is satisfied that the claim is of little or 
no weight, worth, or importance; not worthy of serious attention; 
or trivial.  We do not intend to exhaust the considerations 
relevant to assessing whether a claim is trivial.  We are 
confident that the district courts will be able to weigh the 
contending equities, exercise their discretion, and identify 
those claims that properly survive this frivolousness inquiry. 
See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 ("[F]rivolousness is a decision 
entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the in 
forma pauperis petition," and reviewed only for abuse of that 
discretion employed in sorting the wheat from the chaff.). 
 Finally, we emphasize that our holding should not be 
construed to derogate a court's obligation to consider a pro se 
complaint liberally.  See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 
92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 245 (1972) (per curiam).  Moreover, we 
are not suggesting that a complaint's factual contentions should 
not be weighed in the plaintiff's favor.  Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. 
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Indeed, we stress that, if a court is in doubt as to whether the 
actual amount in controversy is economically trivial, or in doubt 
as to whether the claim is meaningful, then the plaintiff must be 
given the benefit of that doubt, for we do not intend that courts 
use monetary worth as an excuse to brush legitimate grievances 
aside.  
V. 
 Reading Deutsch's pro se complaint with the requisite 
latitude, we agree with the district court that his claim against 
the United States is appropriately considered under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 
(1988).  Cognizable claims under the FTCA include those that are 
[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, 
... [3] for injury or loss of property, ... [4] caused 
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee of the Government [5] while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, [6] under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private 
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance 
with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred. 
   
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Meyer, ___ U.S. 
____, ____, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1001, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (claim 
against United States is cognizable under the FTCA if it alleges 
the six elements outlined above).  Before commencing an action 
under the FTCA, a claimant must have first presented the claim, 
in writing and within two years after its accrual, to the 
appropriate federal agency, and the claim must have been denied. 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a).  To be properly presented to the 
federal agency, the damages claim must be for a sum certain.  28 
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C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1987).  The requirements that a claimant timely 
present a claim, do so in writing, and request a sum certain are 
jurisdictional prerequisites to a suit under the FTCA.  Corte-
Real v. United States, 949 F.2d 484, 485-86 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(citations omitted). 
 Deutsch alleged that he submitted his claim to a 
federal agency for consideration, and that the agency declined to 
offer a settlement.  Weighing Deutsch's allegations in his favor 
for purposes of a § 1915 analysis, it appears that he satisfied 
the FTCA exhaustion requirement.  A review of the complaint also 
suggests that the six elements for a cognizable FTCA claim are 
present.  See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1001.  Deutsch's claim is 
against the United States for money damages, and he has accused 
several prison guards, presumably government actors, of 
committing the alleged wrong while acting in the scope of their 
employment.  Significantly, the FTCA does not set a minimum 
required amount in controversy that must be sought as relief in 
order to maintain jurisdiction.  Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 
1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989).  Therefore, it appears that Deutsch 
has a claim that, on its face, is cognizable in federal court 
under the FTCA. 
 Deutsch's claim is, however, frivolous beyond question 
within the meaning of § 1915 (d), and he must pay the court costs 
and filing fees if he wishes to file it.  First, the amount of 
damages in controversy under the complaint is $4.20, an amount 
less than the $120 payment required for the court costs and 
filing fees.  Second, irrespective of the trivial amount in 
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controversy, the allegations proffered in the complaint suggest 
that there are no interests at stake beyond the recovery of the 
$4.20; hence, there is no other meaningful interest at stake.  We 
are satisfied that Deutsch's claim is undoubtedly one that the 
reasonable paying litigant would not file. 
 We find that several facts contribute to a 
determination that this claim is trivial.  Preliminarily, 
Deutsch's complaint should cause a district court to wonder 
whether Deutsch is interested in recovering the damages 
requested, or whether he is simply honing his already overused 
litigation skills.  See note 4, supra.  In addition, an opinion 
by the Seventh Circuit's Court of Appeals provides an 
enlightening discussion of Deutsch's past litigation experiences. 
See note 2, supra. 
 Aside from the fact that we are satisfied that 
Deutsch's claim lacks meaning to him as a frequent filer of 
frivolous complaints, we find that a court's obligation to guard 
its resources counsels dismissal of this claim.  Indeed, this 
claim lacks meaning from the court's point of view such that 
dismissal would be warranted even if the claim were brought by a 
litigant who had never before filed an in forma pauperis suit in 
federal court.  Significantly, the reasonable paying litigant 
would not find justification for the expense of filing suit in a 
moral or other non-monetary victory over the defendant.  The 
appellant is no longer incarcerated at the facility where the 
alleged wrong occurred, and, quite obviously, he has another pen. 
Moreover, the public simply should not be paying for an indigent 
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litigant to pursue in federal court a claim that the paying 
litigant is practically barred from pursuing.  Although we will 
not establish a bright line for determining when a claim seeking 
an amount of damages that is insufficient to warrant forgiveness 
of the court costs and filing fees, we find that this claim for 
$4.20 is certainly insufficient. 
 In sum, Deutsch may seek to recover for the loss of his 
pens by pursuing remedies afforded by the prison and the agencies 
of the federal government.  After exhausting those remedies, 
however, Deutsch will have to pay court costs and filing fees if 
he wishes to sue for his loss in federal court because his claim 
is "frivolous" under § 1915(d).  We note that the district 
court's dismissal of Deutsch's complaint under § 1915(d) did not 
preclude his filing a paid complaint making the same allegation. 
See Denton, 504 U.S. at 34. 
VI. 
 Deutsch's motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis 
will be granted.  However, for the foregoing reasons, the 
district court's order will be summarily affirmed. 
                          
               
